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Abstract 
Previous research in the area of expert-novice comparisons of 
mathematical problem solving has focused on the differences in 
categorization of and performance on math problems. These studies have 
led to the conclusion that while solving or categorizing problems, experts 
focus on deep processing and novices focus on surface structure. Other 
research dealing with true/false multiplication equations has shown that 
adults (considered experts in multiplication) can reject false answers 
before processing the equation. This study attempts to extend these 
findings by looking at the differences between experts and novices in the 
recognition of errors in true/false calculus verification expressions. The 
participants were professors (experts) and students (novices). The 
experiment consisted of participants answering 68 true/false calculus 
expressions (equations or conditionals) at three levels of difficulty. 
Reaction time, accuracy, and level of confidence were recorded. Experts 
were found to be quicker and more accurate overall. The experts were not 
able to reject the false problems more quickly than accepting the true ones. 
However, there was still some support for the hypothesis that experts are 
not only quantitatively better at task performance, but qualitatively 
different from novices in the type of processing they employ. 
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Error Recognition in Calculus Problems: What Characterizes Expertise? 
Expertise theory has previously shown that experts process 
problems differently than novices do. This has been found across various 
domains. On the surface, it has been found that experts are faster than 
novices at the tasks in their domain. For example, reaction time is the 
defining characteristic of expertise in domains such as typewriting and 
mental calculation. Gentner (1988) used reaction time to define who his 
expert typists were in his study. Staszewski (1988) also used reaction time 
to define expert mental calculators. In tasks such as these, most people 
can complete the task, but the expert is the one who can do it quickly. The 
problem now is to find ways the problems are processed that would justify 
categorization of expertise by speed of processing. 
In the domain of problem solving, reaction time is not necessarily a 
factor defining expertise, but experts usually are faster at solving 
problems in their domain than novices are. An interesting finding by Chi, 
Glaseri, and Rees is that although experts spend less time overall solving 
problems, they spend a greater proportion of their problem solving time 
representing problems than novices do (as cited in Lesgold et aI., 1988). 
This leads to the question of how the experts are representing the 
problems. 
In physics and mathematical expertise research, it has frequently 
been found that problem solvers represent problems in one of two ways, 
surface or deep structure. Using surface structure to categorize problems 
means using information found in the problem statement itself without 
taking anything else into account. Categorizing by deep structure means 
using the underlying theories and principles used in solving the problem. 
Not surprisingly, it has been found that experts generally use deep 
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structure to categorize problems, whereas novices use surface structure. 
This has been found in both physics (Hardiman, Dufresne, and Mestre, 
1989), and mathematics (Schoenfield, 1985). This coincides nicely with the 
idea that experts take a proportionately longer amount of time to represent 
problems than novices. Experts are spending representation time to begin 
solving the problem, but novices are not thinking that deeply yet. In fact, 
Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1981) found that novices use surface structure 
to define how to solve problems. Because trying to solve a problem using 
surface structure often leads to errors and "dead-ends", novices usually 
have longer reaction times and lower accuracy than experts. However, all 
is not lost for novices. It has been found that as expertise in physics 
increased, the method of solving went from surface to deep strategies 
(Anzai, 1985). From this body of research, experts are found to differ from 
novices in problem representation and problem solving. 
How might this be used in other types of problem solving tasks? For 
example, what would happen if the task was determining whether 
answers to statements such as "3 x 3 = 7" are. true or false, instead of 
actually categorizing and solving a particular problem? Researchers in 
arithmetic problem solving have been studying this type of problem. 
There have been some interesting findings concerning the rejection of 
false problems. 
In a true/false verification problem, Zbrodoff and Logan (1990) 
hypothesized that verification is not always production plus comparison. 
Supporting this theory is the finding that there is faster than average 
rejection in certain types of problems. For example, Ashcraft and Stazyk 
(1981) found that people reject extreme splits such as "2 x 2 = 13" quickly. 
They believe this happens because people know that it is not conceivable 
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for the answer to "2 x 2" to be so large. Krueger (1986) and Krueger and 
Hallford (1984) found that when certain arithmetic rules are broken, 
rejection comes quickly. So, if "2 x 2 =5" were to be presented, there would 
be quick rejection because it is impossible to multiply two even numbers 
and come up with an odd number. The same rule is applicable to addition 
problems. Another type of problem that usually warrants a quick 
rejection is one in which signs are switched such as "3 + 4 = 12" or " 3 x 4 = 
7" (Zbrodoff and Logan, 1986). 
For the sake of argument, let's call all of the participants in these 
studies experts at arithmetic. They are not necessarily experts at 
calculation like the expert mental calculators in Staszewski's (1988) 
study. However, they have the experience to be labeled experts at addition 
and multiplication. They have a certain way of processing problems that 
includes quick rejection of false problems based on arithmetic rules and 
tricks. They were obviously not compared to novices, but their strategies 
could be useful in determining how experts in higher level problem solving 
accept and reject problems. 
However, there are certain other types of problems that facilitate 
fast acceptance of true problems and slow rejection of false problems. 
Campbell (1987) found that certain false answers can prevent the 
participant from rejecting the problem quickly enough. We replicated this 
study for the purpose of checking to see what kind of effects we would find 
in the multiplication problems. It may be the case that there is a different 
set of thought processes involved in arithmetic as opposed to upper level 
mathematics. 
Since most people are able to reject certain types of false arithmetic 
problems quickly, experts in the field of calculus should be able to reject 
-8 Error Recognition 
certain types of false calculus problems quickly. They may be able to do 
this because of knowing certain rules or tricks, much like the odd-even 
rule of arithmetic. They might be able to do it quickly because of their 
deeper representation of the problem itself. However, there is much 
stronger evidence that the experts will be able to reject the false equations 
more quickly than accepting true equations. 
Lesgold et al. (1988) found that medical experts diagnosing X-ray 
images will ignore unimportant surface inconsistencies, and focus right 
on the problem. Novices are distracted by unrelated flaws, leading to 
longer latency to finding the real problem and sometimes inaccurate 
diagnoses. The background essentially disappears for these experts, and 
their attention is automatically focused on the real problem within the X­
ray image. In anagram solving tasks, Novick and Cote (1992) found that 
experts at anagrams saw the answers pop out at them (as cited in Matlin, 
1994). In this case, the foreground is jumping out, instead of the 
background diminishing. In calculus problem solving, one of these two 
ideas might also be happening. The difficulty of the calculus task is that 
the problem space is not visual but mental. Therefore, calculus 
verification would be a combination of the two. However, the answer is not 
what is popping out at the expert. The inconsistency, or the mistake in 
reasoning of the problem, is what is popping out. Therefore, rejection of 
false problems should come more quickly than acceptance of the true 
problems as a result of the extraneous background disappearing and the 
mistake popping out. Novices, however, should have to search for the 
mistake and therefore take a longer overall. 
In a calculus verification task, it should be found that experts are 
faster and more accurate than novices. It should also be found that 
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experts are faster at rejecting false problems then accepting true ones. 
This finding is expected because, this apparently happens in arithmetic 
with certain problems, experts encode problems deeply, and 
inconsistencies in the statement might "pop out" at the expert. 
Methods 
Participants 
Forty-nine participants from Illinois Wesleyan University 
participated. Two professors served as experts, and 47 undergraduate 
students served as novices. There were two groups of novices. Group 1 
consisted of 25 students who had completed the equivalent of 0 or 1 
semester of the three-semester calculus sequence at Illinois Wesleyan 
University. The mean age of group 1 was 19.27. There were 17 males and 
8 females in this group. They had completed an average of .7 semesters of 
calculus. The second group consisted of 22 students who had completed 2 
or 3 semesters of the sequence. The mean age of group 2 was 19.5. There 
were 9 males and 13 females in this group. They had completed an 
average of 2.86 semesters of calculus. Group 3 consisted of two experts, 
both males, with the mean age of 39. They had an average of 22 years of 
experience with calculus. 
Materials 
Stimuli for the calculus study consisted of 68 true/false 
mathematical expressions taken and modified from Purcell & Varberg 
(1987), a typical undergraduate calculus book (see appendix A for example 
expressions). 34 of the stimuli were true statements, and 34 were false. 34 
of the expressions were equations, and 34 were if/then statements 
converted to an equation-type of form with an "implies" sign (~). There 
were 30 typical first-semester calculus problems, 26 second-semester 
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calculus problems, and 12 third-semester calculus problems. Thus, most 
of the participants should be familiar with some of the problems. There 
was also a Likert scale to assess the participant's confidence that s/he 
answered the problem correctly. 
Stimuli for the multiplication study consisted of 36 true/false 
multiplication expressions from Campbell (1987) (see appendix A for 
examples). 18 of the stimuli were true, and 18 were false. 18 were hard 
and 18 were easy. The experiment was run at a Macintosh Centris 610 
using the SuperLab (1989) program. The Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 
(K-BIT) (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990) was used to ensure similar 
intelligence across groups (see Appendix B). The participants also 
completed surveys designed to check their level of calculus knowledge (see 
Appendix C). All participants signed a human-participant consent form 
(see Appendix D). 
Procedure 
Participants first signed the consent form and completed the 
participant survey. They were then given the K-BIT (Kaufman & 
Kaufman,1990). Mter they had completed the K-BIT, they were asked to 
sit in front of the computer for instructions. They were instructed to hit 
one key labeled IItrue II or one key labeled "false" as quickly and accurately 
as possible when the arithmetic expression flashed on the screen. They 
were instructed to keep one finger on the IItrue II key, and one finger on the 
"false" key at all times. All participants used their right hand. When the 
subject read and understood the instructions, s/he pressed the "true" key. 
There was then a 500 millisecond (ms) inter-stimulus interval (lSI), after 
which the problem was displayed. When the participant answered, the 
problem was removed from the screen. Mter all of the arithmetic problems 
11Error Recognition 
were finished, instructions appeared for the calculus expressions. When 
the subject read and understood the instructions, s/he pressed the "true" 
key. There was then a 500 millisecond (ms) inter-stimulus interval (lSI), 
after which the problem was displayed. When the participant answered, 
the problem was removed from the screen. There was then a second 500 
ms delay, after which the Likert scale appeared with the instructions for 
the participant to choose how confident s/he was that s/he got the problem 
right on a scale of 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident) (see Figure 
1). The Superlab program recorded the participant's response to each 
problem, whether it was correct, the reaction time in milliseconds, and the 
confidence rating. 
Results 
The calculus results were analyzed using a 3 (expertise level) x 3 
(problem difficulty) x 2 (problem type) x 2 (truth value) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), with reaction time as the dependent variable. The 
results are shown in table 1. We were interested in the following effects. A 
significant effect was found for the interaction of group by truth (F[2, 
3286] =3.311, p < .05). A main effect was found for expertise level (F[2, 
3286] =30.64, p < .04). A BonferronilDunn post-hoc test revealed that 
there was a significant difference between all three groups for expertise 
level (see Figure 2 and Table 2). 
Other analyses include a separate analysis of reaction time on a 
subset of the problems where the confidence level was higher than three. 
The only significant effect was of expertise level (F[2, 1693] =9.179, p < 
.0001). Also, an analysis was done on accuracy, as shown in Table 3. 
There was a significant main effect of expertise level (F[I, 3286] = 40.127, p 
-Error Recognition 12 
< .0001). Post-hoc tests showed that the difference between all three levels 
of expertise was significant (p < .0001) (see Figure 3). 
Results of the multiplication study were analyzed using a 3 
(expertise level) x 2 (truth value) x 2 (problem difficulty) ANOVA. The 
results revealed significant main effects of truth (F[l, 1748] = 4.223, p < 
.05) on reaction time. The mean of the true problems was 1372.374 ms, and 
the mean of the false problems was 1640.972 ms (see Table 4). 
K-BIT scores revealed that all three groups were within one 
standard deviation of each other. 
Discussion 
The finding that experts are faster than novices in general supports 
the theory that experts complete tasks in their domain faster than novices 
do. It is very interesting to note that the experts had faster reaction times 
than both levels of novice. This seems to be a straightforward finding. 
However, the lower novices had significantly lower reaction times than 
the higher novices. But the low novices were only at about 50% accuracy.' 
This indicates that there was a lot of blind guessing on the part of the 
lower novices. However, the experts were much faster than the lower 
novices, and were much more accurate. This supports the theory that 
experts are solving the problem in ways that are qualitatively different 
from novices. They are able to encode and to solve the problems accurately 
even more quickly than naive subjects are able to guess blindly! 
For this particular study, however, we are interested in the 
interaction of expertise level and truth value. We expected to find that as 
expertise level increased, there is an increase in the difference in reaction 
times of true and false problems, with false problems taking a shorter 
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amount of time than the true problems. However, we did not find this 
effect. There are a few reasons that this might be. 
First and foremost, a major flaw in this study is the small sample 
size of experts. Since there are only two experts in our study, it is 
impossible for us to draw any definite conclusions. Because of the nature 
of expertise, it is hard to find experts to participate in studies. Even when 
they are found, there are problems. For example, Larkin, McDermitt, 
Simon & Simon have found that in the physics domain, novices use 
backward inferences to solve the problems, while experts use forward 
inference. This is almost always agreed upon in literature (as cited in 
Priest and Lindsay, 1992). However, when Priest and Lindsay (1992) used 
a much larger sample size, they found that both experts and novices use 
forward inference. Sample size might need to be taken into account. 
However, the experts in their study were graduate students, whereas the 
experts in our study are professors, who have many more years of 
experience than graduate students. In problem solving tasks, it is widely· 
agreed upon that acquiring expertise takes time and practice. Perhaps 
their finding is a result of the use of graduate students, not sample size. 
Because of this problem, however, it is important to take sample size into 
consideration. Perhaps with a greater sample size, we would have seen 
the desired effect. 
Another potential explanation is that experts may have different 
schemes for processing different types of problems. For example, we found 
the same thing as Campbell in that the true problems were actually faster 
than the false problems in the multiplication study. This is different from 
previous research in the field of arithmetic. So, perhaps the type of 
problem used is a factor. To see if this may be true, the interaction of 
•
 
Error Recognition 14 
problem type and expertise in the calculus study was considered. It was 
found that this was not a significant finding. 
However, there may be a potential source of error in the fact that 
there are other differences in the problems themselves. The problems in 
this study were from chapter reviews, intended to make sure the students 
have learned the fine points of the chapter. The novices might not have 
even recognized that these were trick problems. Thus, a different way to 
look at these problems would be to have different levels of error as an 
independent variable. Perhaps experts are better at picking out deep or 
conceptual errors, whereas novices would be better at picking up on 
surface errors. 
One other possible source of error is that not all novices are alike. 
Some may be better problem solvers, and therefore more expert-like in 
their processing. Mathematics is something that follows the phrase "use 
it or lose it". A different measurement may be using two different novice 
groups. All the novices would have the same level of formal calculus 
instruction. This instruction would have to be recent. The characteristic 
that would distinguish the two groups would be grades in the calculus 
classes. Then, if the hypothetical interaction is found, it would give even 
more support to the hypothesis that as novices become experts, they shift 
to expert thought processes, which would agree with the study by Anzai 
(1985). 
This line of research may give us more understanding into the 
expert mind. Perhaps teaching methods could be modified to try to have 
children learning to think like the experts. Dufresne, Gerace, Hardiman, 
Mestre (1992) and Mestre, Dufresne, Gerace, and Hardiman (1993) have 
already found that teaching students to solve physics problems using 
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expert-like strategies leads to more expert-like problem solving. 
Schoenfield (1985) found that this is also true for mathematical problem 
solving. 
One possible application of this study is to take the findings and 
base education ideas on them. In this study, we found more support that 
the experts are quantitatively better than novices in solving problems in 
that they were able to accurately process problems more quickly than 
novices can guess. However, this study was not able to find exactly what 
these quantitative differences are. Consequently, this study would not 
contribute to the educational theories. However, this study could be added 
to the many others in this field, and reviewed with the idea of educational 
implications in mind. The study of the qualitative differences of 
processing between novices and experts is a step toward applying this type 
of research to a real-world situation, education. 
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Appendix A 
Example Calculus and Multiplication Problems 
Calculus 
.J2 .J21n 1tTrue equation: n = e
 
False equation: [f(x)· g(x)]' = f'(x)· g'(x)
 
5
False conditional: y=n ~ Dxy=5n4 
True conditional: y = (X3 + X)8 ~ D;5y =0 
Multiplication 
True easy: 3 x 4 = 12 
False easy: 5 x 6 =35 
True hard: 4 x 9 =36 
False hard: 7 x 8 =48 
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Appendix B 
K-Bit Answer Sheet 
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Appendix C
 
Surveys
 
Background Questionnaire - Expert
 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
1.	 Age (years): 
2.	 Sex: 
MALE 
FEMALE 
3.	 Please list some of your hobbies: 
4. Please list all of the classes you are teaching this semester: 
5.	 How much do you use calculus on a daily basis? 
NEVER 
RARELY 
SOMETIMES 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS 
6.	 How many years have you been working with calculus? 
7.	 About how many years has it been since you've had formal 
instruction in calculus? 
8.	 How good of a calculus user do you feel you are? 
EXCELLENT 
GOOD 
AVERAGE 
BELOW AVERAGE 
POOR 
•
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Back~ound Questionnaire - Novice 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
l.	 Age (years): 3. Sex 
MALE 
2. Year in school:	 FEMALE 
4.	 Major: Minor: _ 
5.	 Please list some of your hobbies: 
6. Right now, what career do you plan to go into? Please be as 
specific as possible. 
7.	 Please list all of the college math courses you have taken and 
when you took them: (ex. Calculus 1, 2, linear algebra ­
freshman year, probability, statistics - sophomore year, etc.). 
Write (lP) after any classes in progress. 
8.	 How much do you use calculus on a daily basis? 
NEVER 
RARELY 
SOMETIMES 
OFTEN 
ALWAYS 
9.	 How good of a calculus student do you feel you are? 
EXCELLENT 
GOOD 
AVERAGE 
BELOW AVERAGE 
POOR 
•
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Appendix D 
Consent Form 
rninois Wesleyqrlllli~aity 25 
Department of Psychology 
Consent Form for Research Participants 
•
 
Title of Study: Experience and knowledge representation in mathematical problem solving 
Principle Investigator: Lionel R. Shapiro, Ph.D. 
This is a study of thinking and how thinking may change under different conditions. We are 
investigating whether factors such as experience change the way that people solve problems. As 
a participant, you may be asked some general information questions pertaining to your medical 
and educational background and then be given two tests: a brief intelligence test which takes 
approximately 30 minutes, and a test involving the solution ofmathematical problems, which 
also takes approximately 30 minutes and is administered on a computer. (Please note that no 
computer expertise is required and that your use of the computer will consist only of pressing one 
of two keys.) 
The intelligence test contains items related to your vocabulary and your ability to solve spatial 
problems. The computer test requires you to identify mathematical expressions as either correct 
or incorrect. You will be given several sets of these expressions and the time it takes you to solve 
them will be measured. 
Your intelligence test score, as well as your solution times, will be kept completely 
confidential. Although the data collected today may be published in the future, your name will 
never be connected with your scores or with the study in published form. 
There are no known risks involved with this study, and although some participants may find the 
problems challenging, most do not find the tasks uncomfortable. 
There are no known direct benefits to you as a result ofyour participation in this study, but your 
participation may help others indirectly by providing us with information on the nature of 
thinking. 
As a participant in this study, you have the right to ask questions pertaining to the clarification 
ofyour tasks, and to be informed of the nature of the study before you begin. Your p8rticipation 
is voluntary, and as such, you have the right to refuse to participate or to withdraw from the 
study at any time, with no penalty or loss of benefit. You will receive additional information 
about the study following your participation. You may, ifyou wish, receive a copy of this consent 
form. 
By signing below, you acknowledge that you have read this consent form and you understand 
your rights in this study. 
Name of participant (please print) _ 
Signature of participant _ 
Date signed _ 
Name of experimenter _ 
Signature ofexperimenter _ 
Date signed _ 
Name ofwitne88 _ 
Signature of witness _ 
Date signed _ 
•
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Table 1 
Analysis of Variance for Reaction Time for Calculus 
Source df SS MS F-value 
E 2 12724763634.103 6362381817.052 30.064* 
T 1 41305657.271 41305657.271 .195 
ExT 2 1401547335.765 700773667.883 3.311* 
PT 1 41956638.517 41956638.517 .198 
ExPT 2 268637530.166 134318765.083 .635 
TxPT 1 352702967.913 352702967.913 1.667 
ExTxPT 2 1474004025.705 737002012.853 3.482* 
D 2 1617985744.810 808992872.405 3.823* 
ExD 4 1186129629.404 296532407.351 1.401 
TxD 2 655380452.882 327690226.441 1.548 
ExTxD 4 341615234.843 85403808.711 .404 
PTxD 2 382896562.054 191448281.027 .905 
ExPTxD 4 255906919.039 63976729.76 .302 
TxPTxD 2 42135925.601 .21067962.800 .100 
ExTxPTxD 4 248650926.008 62162731.502 .294 
Residual 3286 695419374332.719 211630972.104 
Note: E =Expertise Level, T =Truth Level, PT =Problem Type, D =Problem 
Difficulty 
* p < .05. 
•
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Table 2 
Mean reaction time and accuracy as a function of expertise level. for 
Calculus 
Expertise Level Reaction Time Accuracy 
Low Novice 13074.196 ms .532 
High Novice 16898.068 ms .640 
Expert 7293.089 ms .948 
•
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for Accuracy for Calculus 
Source df SS MS F-value 
E 2 18.413 9.207 40.127* 
T 1 .521 .521 2.271 
ExT 2 .114 .057 .249 
PT 1 .902 .902 3.933* 
ExPT 2 .385 .193 .839 
TxPT 1 .112 .112 .489 
ExTxPT 2 .613 .306 1.335 
D 2 .138 .069 .301 
ExD 4 .510 .128 .556 
TxD 2 .099 .049 .216 
ExTxD 4 1.198 .299 1.305 
PTxD 2 .853 .426 1.859 
ExPTxD 4 .882 .221 .961 
TxPTxD 2 .215 .107 .468 
ExTxPTxD 4 .146 .036 .159 
Residual 3286 753.929 .229 
Note: E =Expertise Level, T =Truth Level, PT =Problem Type, D = 
Problem Difficulty 
* p < .05. 
•
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance for Reaction Time for Multiplication 
Source elf SS MS F-value 
E 2 22137226.939 11068613.470 6.298* 
D 1 14648335.386 14648335.386 8.335* 
ExD 2 7825734.005 3912867.002 2.227 
T 1 7420788.580 7420788.580 4.223* 
ExT 2 1215385.626 607692.813 .346 
DxT 1 2141.601 2141.601 .001 
ExDxT 2 697050.763 348525.381 .198 
Residual 1748 3071847919.728 1757350.068 
Note E =Expertise Level, D =Problem Difficulty, T =Truth Level 
* p < .05. 
•
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Figure Caption
 
Figure 1. Likert scale for confidence judgments.
 
Figure 2. Reaction time as a function of expertise level in calculus (with
 
error bars representing one standard error)
 
Fi~ure 3. Accuracy as a function of expertise level in calculus (with error
 
bars representing one standard error)
 
•
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